Case Digest: People v. Tan

G.R. No. 117321 February 11, 1998
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. HERSON TAN y VERZO, accused-appellant.

FACTS:
Tricycle driver Freddie Saavedra went to see his wife, Delfa, a to inform her that he will drive Lito Amido and appellant Herson Tan to Barangay Maligaya. It was the last time that Freddie was seen alive. His body was later found sprawled on a diversion road with fourteen stab wounds.

Subsequently, Lt. Santos, Cpl. Numeriano Aguilar and Pat. Rolando Alandy invited appellant in connection with the instant case and with respect to two other robbery cases reported in Lucena City. During their conversation, appellant allegedly gave an explicit account of what actually transpired in the case at bar. He narrated that he and co-accused Amido were responsible for the loss of the motorcycle and the consequent death of Saavedra. Moreover, he averred that they sold the motorcycle to a certain Danny Teves of Barrio Summit, Muntinlupa. With the help of appellant as a guide, the Lucena PNP immediately dispatched a team to retrieve the same.

Tan and Amido were charged with the crime of highway robbery with murder

Lt. Carlos, on cross-examination, testified that when he invited appellant to their headquarters, he had no warrant for his arrest. In the course thereof, he informed the latter that he was a suspect, not only in the instant case, but also in two other robbery cases allegedly committed in Lucena City. In the belief that they were merely conversing inside the police station, he admitted that he did not inform appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel; nor did he reduce the supposed confession to writing.

In a decision dated April 21, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the confession of the appellant, given before a police investigator upon invitation and without the benefit of counsel, is admissible in evidence against him.

HELD: No.

It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or admission and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as inadmissible in evidence against the confessant. R.A. No. 7438 reenforced the constitutional mandate protecting the rights of persons under custodial investigation, a pertinent provision of which reads:

As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law.

Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. The rules on custodial investigation begin to operate as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that tends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate.

Furthermore, not only does the fundamental law impose, as a requisite function of the investigating officer, the duty to explain those rights to the accused but also that there must correspondingly be a meaningful communication to and understanding thereof by the accused. A mere perfunctory reading by the constable of such rights to the accused would thus not suffice.
Under the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.

While the Constitution sanctions the waiver of the right to counsel, it must, however, be "voluntary, knowing and intelligent, and must be made in the presence and with the assistance of counsel."

Any statement obtained in violation of the constitution, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Even if the confession contains a grain of truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. The evidence for the prosecution shows that when appellant was invited for questioning at the police headquarters, he allegedly admitted his participation in the crime. This will not suffice to convict him, however, of said crime. The constitutional rights of appellant, particularly the right to remain silent and to counsel, are impregnable from the moment he is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, even if the same be initiated by mere invitation. "This Court values liberty and will always insist on the observance of basic constitutional rights as a condition sine qua non against the awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of government."

Case Digest: People v. Tampus

G.R. No. L-44690 March 28, 1980

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE TAMPUS Y PONCE, accused whose death sentence is under review.

FACTS:
At around ten o'clock in the morning of January 14, 1976, Celso Saminado, a prisoner in the national penitentiary at Muntinlupa, went to the toilet to answer a call of nature and to fetch water.

The accused, Jose Tampus and Rodolfo Avila, prisoners in the same penal institution, followed Saminado to the toilet and, by means of their bladed weapons, assaulted him. Saminado died upon arrival in the prison hospital. After emerging from the toilet, Tampus and Avila surrendered to a prison guard with their knives. They told the guard: "Surrender po kami, sir. Gumanti lang po kami."

The officer of the day investigated the incident right away. In his written report submitted on the same day when the tragic occurrence transpired, he stated that, according to his on-the-spot investigation, Avila stabbed Saminado when the latter was armed in the comfort room and his back was turned to Avila, while Tampus stabbed the victim on the chest and neck

Two days after the killing, or on January 16, another prison guard investigated Tampus and Avila and obtained their extrajudicial confessions wherein they admitted that they assaulted Saminado.

The trial was held at the state penitentiary at the insistence of the Avila. The court found Tampus and Avila guilty for the murder of Saminado.

In this review of the death sentence, the counsel de oficio of appellant raises the following issues:

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the confession of Tampus was taken in violation of Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution (now Sec. 12, Art. IV of the 1987 Const)
2. W/N the trial court should have advised defendant Tampus of his right to remain silent after the fiscal had presented the prosecution's evidence and when counsel de oficio called upon Tampus to testify
3. W/N defendant Tampus was denied to his right to public trial because the arraignment and hearing were held at the state penitentiary

HELD:
1. No. Even before the investigation for the killing was inititated, Tampus and Avila had already admitted it when, after coming out of the scene of the crime, they surrendered to the first guard whom they encountered, and they revealed to him that they had committed an act of revenge. That spontaneous statement, elicited without any interrogation, was part of the res gestae and at the same time was a voluntary confession of guilt.
Not only that. The two accused, by means of that statement given freely on the spur of the moment without any urging or suggestion, waived their right to remain silent and to have the right to counsel. That admission was confirmed by their extrajudicial confession, plea of guilty and testimony in court.

Under the circumstances, it is not appropriate for counsel de oficio to rely on the rulings in Escobedo vs. Illinois and Miranda vs. Arizona regarding the rights of the accused to be assisted by counsel and to remain silent during custodial interrogation.

It should be stressed that, even without taking into account Tampus' admission of guilt, confession, plea of guilty and testimony, the crime was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence of the prosecution.

2. No, considering that Tampus pleaded guilty and had executed an extrajudicial confession.
The court during the trial is not duty-bound to apprise the accused that he has the right to remain silent. It is his counsel who should claim that right for him. If he does not claim it and he calls the accused to the witness stand, then he waives that right

3. No. The record does not show that the public was actually excluded from the place where the trial was held or that the accused was prejudiced by the holding of the trial in the national penitentiary.

Besides, there is a ruling that the fact that for the convenience of the witnesses a case is tried in Bilibid Prison without any objection on the part of the accused is not a ground for reversal of the judgment of conviction (U.S. vs. Mercado, 4 Phil. 304).

The accused may waive his right to have a public trial as shown in the rule that the trial court may motu propio exclude the public from the courtroom when the evidence to be offered is offensive to decency or public morals. The court may also, upon request of the defendant, exclude from the trial every person except the officers of the court and the attorneys for the prosecution and defense.


TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

The extra-judicial confession of the accused is manifestly barred from admission under the Bill of Rights.

I have grave doubts as to the alleged waiver by the accused of his constitutional right to counsel and to remain silent given in the middle of his "voluntary" extrajudicial confession during his custodial interrogation by the prison investigator, who at such late stage (in propounding question No. 6, not at the beginning of the interrogation) purportedly took time out to admonish and inform the accused of his rights to counsel and to silence. The fundamental rights of such unfortunate disadvantaged persons as the accused should all the more be clearly protected and observed. At the very least, such alleged waiver must be witnessed by a responsible official of the penitentiary, if not by the municipal judge of the locality.

Counsel for the accused's second assigned error is also well taken. After the prosecutor had presented the State's evidence at the hearing for the purpose, and when counsel de oficio then called upon the accused to testify, it became the trial court's duty (contrary to the majority's ruling) to apprise and admonish him of his constitutional rights to remain silent and against self-incrimination, i.e. the right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself.

Under the above-cited section 20 of the Bill of Rights, any confession or incriminatory statement obtained in violation thereof is expressly declared "inadmissible in evidence."