Marawi City and Martial Law

It is heartbreaking to see the siege of Marawi City. Thousands of residents were affected by the terroristic acts of the Maute Group, which has allied itself with the ISIS, another terrorist group which sows nothing but misguided hate.

It was understandable, then, for the president to take control of the situation, and a tool for doing so is by imposing martial law.

Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution states that:

 "In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

"The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without any need of a call.

"The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing."

This is not the Marcos Martial Law, in which the president preempted everyone from reacting adversely, cutting the voice of the legislature and cowing the Judiciary into falling in line.

In the present constitution, the Congress shall convene and may revoke or approve or extend the proclamation. The Supreme Court, in turn, may review the the proclamation.

It is thus imperative for these two branches to not just meekly dance to the tune of the executive and check the propriety and legality of the martial law declaration.

Martial law is not inherently evil. If it were, the framers of the 1987 Constitution would have removed such power entirely, especially considering the country's wounds from the tyranny of martial law were still fresh then.  It is a necessary tool for extreme situations such as invasion or rebellion, which is, depending on your viewpoint, is happening now.

On the part of all the people, and not just the Congress and Judiciary, we have to remain extra vigilant in order that the depth, breadth, and duration of the martial law are just enough to restore order in Marawi City.

Why President-Elect?

Today marks a momentous occasion in which Noynoy Aquino and Jejomar Binay were proclaimed by the joint congress as President-elect and Vice-President-elect, respectively.

The term President-elect has been thrown around lately, although as to why the term is being used may be unclear to Juan dela Cruz.

Why can't we call Aquino Mr. President yet? Because the Presidency will be turned over only June 30, when he will be inaugurated as the President.

Until then, our president is still you-know-who.

Before today (when Congress was still canvassing the votes), Aquino was not even President-elect yet. We only assumed that he's going to be the next President because partial and unofficial counts showed he was ahead by a wide margin.

In the eyes of the Constitution, he was still a mere candidate.

But after the proclamation by Congress earlier, we can now officially refer to him as the President-elect.

It has important consequences, especially when it comes to vacancy.

Section 7, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution reads:

The President-elect and the Vice President-elect shall assume office at the beginning of their terms.

If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until the President-elect shall have qualified.

If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until a President shall have been chosen and qualified.

If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall have died or shall have become permanently disabled, the Vice President-elect shall become President.

Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or shall have qualified, or where both shall have died or become permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall act as President until a President or a Vice-President shall have been chosen and qualified.

xxx

The first paragraph pertains to the start of their term, "which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date, six years thereafter." (Sec 4, Art VII)

The second paragraph will not come into operation, presumably because both Aquino and Binay are qualified.

(Note: It's not really hard to be a qualified candidate, you just need to be a natural-born citizen, registered voter, be able to read and write, be at least 40 years old on election day, and be a resident for at least 10 years prior to elections. [Sec 2, Art VII])

Third paragraph will not come into play, since there is no question that the voters had chosen their President-elect.

The fourth and fifth paragraphs are crucial: if something untoward happens to Aquino and/or Binay (knock on wood), these will come into play.

Hopefully, nothing bad happens to both Aquino and Binay between now and June 30. The Constitution's Section 7, Article VII works best if it's not used at all, and relegated to sexennial trivia.


Photo: Jeffrey Avellanosa, Wikimedia, Creative Commons

Case Digest: Lozano v. Martinez

G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986
FLORENTINA A. LOZANO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XX, Manila, and the HONORABLE JOSE B. FLAMINIANO, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Manila, respondents.

YAP, J:
Petitioners, charged with Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the Bouncing Check Law, assail the law's constitutionality.

BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment." The penalty prescribed for the offense is imprisonment of not less than 30 days nor more than one year or a fine or not less than the amount of the check nor more than double said amount, but in no case to exceed P200,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

The statute likewise imposes the same penalty on "any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.

An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment. Since this involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge where payment of the check "is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check. To mitigate the harshness of the law in its application, the statute provides that such presumption shall not arise if within five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment of the check by the bank or pays the holder the amount of the check.

Another provision of the statute, also in the nature of a rule of evidence, provides that the introduction in evidence of the unpaid and dishonored check with the drawee bank's refusal to pay "stamped or written thereon or attached thereto, giving the reason therefor, "shall constitute prima facie proof of "the making or issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof ... for the reason written, stamped or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check."

The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused of course to present proof to the contrary to overcome the said presumptions.

ISSUE: Whether or not (W/N) BP 22 violates the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt.

HELD: No.
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.

The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.

ISSUE: W/N BP 22 impairs the freedom to contract.
HELD: No. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.

ISSUE: W/N it violates the equal protection clause.
HELD: No. Petitioners contend that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the swindler and the swindled. Moreover, the clause does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is no unreasonable or arbitrary.

Case Digest: Beltran v. Samson and Jose

G.R. No. 32025 September 23, 1929
FRANCISCO BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. FELIX SAMSON, Judge of the Second Judicial District, and FRANCISCO JOSE, Provincial Fiscal of Isabela, respondents.

ROMUALDEZ:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein the petitioner complains that the respondent judge ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting from the latter.

The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of comparing the petitioner's handwriting and determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified.

ISSUE: Whether or not the order violates the petitioner's right against self-incrimination.

HELD: Yes.

The constitutional inhibition is directed not merely in giving of oral testimony, but embraces as well the furnishing of evidence by other means than by word of mouth, the divulging, in short, of any fact which the accused has a right to hold secret.

Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier.

For the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. The present case is more serious than that of compelling the production of documents or chattels, because here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier.

It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, according to Exhibit A, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.

Note: Measuring or photographing the party is not within the privilege. Nor is the removal or replacement of his garments or shoes.

Case Digest: Cabal v. Kapunan

G.R. No. L-19052, December 29, 1962
MANUEL F. CABAL, petitioner, vs. HON. RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR., and THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, respondents.

CONCEPCION, J.:
Col. Jose C. Maristela filed with the Secretary of National Defense a letter-complaint charging petitioner Manuel Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the AFP, with "graft, corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, and other equally reprehensible acts". The President of the Philippines created a committee to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth. The Committee ordered petitioner herein to take the witness stand in the administrative proceeding and be sworn to as witness for Maristela, in support of his aforementioned charge of unexplained wealth. Petitioner objected to the order of the Committee, invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Committee insisted that petitioner take the witness stand and be sworn to, subject to his right to refuse to answer such questions as may be incriminatory. This notwithstanding, petitioner respectfully refused to be sworn to as a witness to take the witness stand.

The Committee referred the matter to the Fiscal of Manila, for such action as he may deem proper. The City Fiscal filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a "charge" of contempt for failing to obey the order of the Committee to take the witness stand. The "charge" was assigned to the sala of respondent judge Kapunan. Petitioner filed with respondent Judge a motion to quash, which was denied. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Committee's order requiring petitioner to take the witness stand violates his constitutional right against self-incrimination.

HELD: Yes.
Although the said Committee was created to investigate the administrative charge of unexplained wealth, it seems that the purpose of the charge against petitioner is to apply the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer or employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property. However, such forfeiture has been held to partake of the nature of a penalty. As a consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of property are deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal case from the obligation to be witnesses against themselves are applicable thereto.

No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. This prohibition against compelling a person to take the stand as a witness against himself applies to criminal, quasi-criminal, and penal proceedings, including a proceeding civil in form for forfeiture of property by reason of the commission of an offense, but not a proceeding in which the penalty recoverable is civil or remedial in nature.

The privilege of a witness not to incriminate himself is not infringed by merely asking the witness a question which he refuses to answer. The privilege is simply an option of refusal, and not a prohibition of inquiry. A question is not improper merely because the answer may tend to incriminate but, where a witness exercises his constitutional right not to answer, a question by counsel as to whether the reason for refusing to answer is because the answer may tend to incriminate the witness is improper.

The possibility that the examination of the witness will be pursued to the extent of requiring self-incrimination will not justify the refusal to answer questions. However, where the position of the witness is virtually that of an accused on trial, it would appear that he may invoke the privilege in support of a blanket refusal to answer any and all questions.

Note: It is not disputed that the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand.

Case Digest: US v. Navarro

G.R. No. 1272, January 11, 1904
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee, vs. BALDOMERO NAVARRO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

FACTS:
The defendants, Baldomero Navarro, Marcelo de Leon, and Fidel Feliciano are convicted of the crime of illegal detention under Article 481 and of 483 of the Penal Code. They were sentenced to life imprisonment.

Article 481 of the Penal Code provides that a private person who shall lock up or detain another, or in any way deprive him of his liberty shall be punished with the penalty of prision mayor.

The second paragraph of article 483 provides that one who illegally detains another and fails to give information concerning his whereabouts, or does not prove that he set him at liberty, shall be punished with cadena temporal in its maximum degree to life imprisonment.

The punishment for the crime mentioned in article 483 of the Penal Code is the penalty of cadena temporal in its maximum degree to cadena perpetua, or in other words one convicted of simply depriving a person of his liberty may be imprisoned for a term of from six to twelve years and one convicted of depriving a person of his liberty and who shall not state his whereabouts or prove that he had set said person at liberty may be punished by imprisonment for a term of seventeen years four months and one day, to life, as in this case. In other words, for failure on the part of the defendant to testify regarding the whereabouts of the person deprived of his liberty, or to prove that he was set at liberty, the punishment may be increased from imprisonment for a term of six years to life imprisonment.

On appeal, counsel for the defendants argued that the provisions of the law has the effect of forcing a defendant to become a witness in his own behalf or to take a much severer punishment. The burden is put upon him of giving evidence if he desires to lessen the penalty, or, in other words, of incriminating himself, for the very statement of the whereabouts of the victim or the proof that the defendant set him at liberty amounts to a confession that the defendant unlawfully detained the person. So the evidence necessary to clear the defendant, under article 483 of the Penal Code, would have the effect of convincing him under article 481. It is claimed that such practice is illegal, since section 5 of the Philippine Bill provides that ". . . no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants' rights against self-incrimination were violated.

HELD: Yes.
The right against self-incrimination was established on the grounds of public policy and humanity - of policy, because if the party were required to testify, it would place the witness under the strongest temptation to commit the crime of perjury, and of humanity, because it would prevent the extorting of confessions by duress.

Under the present system, the information must charge the accused with acts committed by him prior to the filing of the information and which of themselves constitute an offense against the law. The Government can not charge a man with one of the necessary elements of an offense and trust to his making out the rest by availing himself of his right to leave the entire burden of prosecuting on the prosecution from beginning to end.

If the disclosure thus made would be capable of being used against him as a confession of crime, or an admission of facts tending to prove the commission of an offense, such disclosure would be an accusation against himself.

In the present case, if the defendant disclosed the whereabouts of the person taken, or shows that he was given his liberty, this disclosure may be used to obtain a conviction under article 481 of the Penal Code.

It is the duty of the prosecution, in order to convict one of a crime, to produce evidence showing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and the accused can not be called upon either by express words or acts to assist in the production of such evidence; nor should his silence be taken as proof against him. He has a right to rely on the presumption of innocence until the prosecution proves him guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged.

Case Digest: People v. Tan

G.R. No. 117321 February 11, 1998
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. HERSON TAN y VERZO, accused-appellant.

FACTS:
Tricycle driver Freddie Saavedra went to see his wife, Delfa, a to inform her that he will drive Lito Amido and appellant Herson Tan to Barangay Maligaya. It was the last time that Freddie was seen alive. His body was later found sprawled on a diversion road with fourteen stab wounds.

Subsequently, Lt. Santos, Cpl. Numeriano Aguilar and Pat. Rolando Alandy invited appellant in connection with the instant case and with respect to two other robbery cases reported in Lucena City. During their conversation, appellant allegedly gave an explicit account of what actually transpired in the case at bar. He narrated that he and co-accused Amido were responsible for the loss of the motorcycle and the consequent death of Saavedra. Moreover, he averred that they sold the motorcycle to a certain Danny Teves of Barrio Summit, Muntinlupa. With the help of appellant as a guide, the Lucena PNP immediately dispatched a team to retrieve the same.

Tan and Amido were charged with the crime of highway robbery with murder

Lt. Carlos, on cross-examination, testified that when he invited appellant to their headquarters, he had no warrant for his arrest. In the course thereof, he informed the latter that he was a suspect, not only in the instant case, but also in two other robbery cases allegedly committed in Lucena City. In the belief that they were merely conversing inside the police station, he admitted that he did not inform appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel; nor did he reduce the supposed confession to writing.

In a decision dated April 21, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the confession of the appellant, given before a police investigator upon invitation and without the benefit of counsel, is admissible in evidence against him.

HELD: No.

It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or admission and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as inadmissible in evidence against the confessant. R.A. No. 7438 reenforced the constitutional mandate protecting the rights of persons under custodial investigation, a pertinent provision of which reads:

As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law.

Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. The rules on custodial investigation begin to operate as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that tends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate.

Furthermore, not only does the fundamental law impose, as a requisite function of the investigating officer, the duty to explain those rights to the accused but also that there must correspondingly be a meaningful communication to and understanding thereof by the accused. A mere perfunctory reading by the constable of such rights to the accused would thus not suffice.
Under the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.

While the Constitution sanctions the waiver of the right to counsel, it must, however, be "voluntary, knowing and intelligent, and must be made in the presence and with the assistance of counsel."

Any statement obtained in violation of the constitution, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Even if the confession contains a grain of truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. The evidence for the prosecution shows that when appellant was invited for questioning at the police headquarters, he allegedly admitted his participation in the crime. This will not suffice to convict him, however, of said crime. The constitutional rights of appellant, particularly the right to remain silent and to counsel, are impregnable from the moment he is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, even if the same be initiated by mere invitation. "This Court values liberty and will always insist on the observance of basic constitutional rights as a condition sine qua non against the awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of government."

Case Digest: People v. Tampus

G.R. No. L-44690 March 28, 1980

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE TAMPUS Y PONCE, accused whose death sentence is under review.

FACTS:
At around ten o'clock in the morning of January 14, 1976, Celso Saminado, a prisoner in the national penitentiary at Muntinlupa, went to the toilet to answer a call of nature and to fetch water.

The accused, Jose Tampus and Rodolfo Avila, prisoners in the same penal institution, followed Saminado to the toilet and, by means of their bladed weapons, assaulted him. Saminado died upon arrival in the prison hospital. After emerging from the toilet, Tampus and Avila surrendered to a prison guard with their knives. They told the guard: "Surrender po kami, sir. Gumanti lang po kami."

The officer of the day investigated the incident right away. In his written report submitted on the same day when the tragic occurrence transpired, he stated that, according to his on-the-spot investigation, Avila stabbed Saminado when the latter was armed in the comfort room and his back was turned to Avila, while Tampus stabbed the victim on the chest and neck

Two days after the killing, or on January 16, another prison guard investigated Tampus and Avila and obtained their extrajudicial confessions wherein they admitted that they assaulted Saminado.

The trial was held at the state penitentiary at the insistence of the Avila. The court found Tampus and Avila guilty for the murder of Saminado.

In this review of the death sentence, the counsel de oficio of appellant raises the following issues:

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the confession of Tampus was taken in violation of Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution (now Sec. 12, Art. IV of the 1987 Const)
2. W/N the trial court should have advised defendant Tampus of his right to remain silent after the fiscal had presented the prosecution's evidence and when counsel de oficio called upon Tampus to testify
3. W/N defendant Tampus was denied to his right to public trial because the arraignment and hearing were held at the state penitentiary

HELD:
1. No. Even before the investigation for the killing was inititated, Tampus and Avila had already admitted it when, after coming out of the scene of the crime, they surrendered to the first guard whom they encountered, and they revealed to him that they had committed an act of revenge. That spontaneous statement, elicited without any interrogation, was part of the res gestae and at the same time was a voluntary confession of guilt.
Not only that. The two accused, by means of that statement given freely on the spur of the moment without any urging or suggestion, waived their right to remain silent and to have the right to counsel. That admission was confirmed by their extrajudicial confession, plea of guilty and testimony in court.

Under the circumstances, it is not appropriate for counsel de oficio to rely on the rulings in Escobedo vs. Illinois and Miranda vs. Arizona regarding the rights of the accused to be assisted by counsel and to remain silent during custodial interrogation.

It should be stressed that, even without taking into account Tampus' admission of guilt, confession, plea of guilty and testimony, the crime was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence of the prosecution.

2. No, considering that Tampus pleaded guilty and had executed an extrajudicial confession.
The court during the trial is not duty-bound to apprise the accused that he has the right to remain silent. It is his counsel who should claim that right for him. If he does not claim it and he calls the accused to the witness stand, then he waives that right

3. No. The record does not show that the public was actually excluded from the place where the trial was held or that the accused was prejudiced by the holding of the trial in the national penitentiary.

Besides, there is a ruling that the fact that for the convenience of the witnesses a case is tried in Bilibid Prison without any objection on the part of the accused is not a ground for reversal of the judgment of conviction (U.S. vs. Mercado, 4 Phil. 304).

The accused may waive his right to have a public trial as shown in the rule that the trial court may motu propio exclude the public from the courtroom when the evidence to be offered is offensive to decency or public morals. The court may also, upon request of the defendant, exclude from the trial every person except the officers of the court and the attorneys for the prosecution and defense.


TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

The extra-judicial confession of the accused is manifestly barred from admission under the Bill of Rights.

I have grave doubts as to the alleged waiver by the accused of his constitutional right to counsel and to remain silent given in the middle of his "voluntary" extrajudicial confession during his custodial interrogation by the prison investigator, who at such late stage (in propounding question No. 6, not at the beginning of the interrogation) purportedly took time out to admonish and inform the accused of his rights to counsel and to silence. The fundamental rights of such unfortunate disadvantaged persons as the accused should all the more be clearly protected and observed. At the very least, such alleged waiver must be witnessed by a responsible official of the penitentiary, if not by the municipal judge of the locality.

Counsel for the accused's second assigned error is also well taken. After the prosecutor had presented the State's evidence at the hearing for the purpose, and when counsel de oficio then called upon the accused to testify, it became the trial court's duty (contrary to the majority's ruling) to apprise and admonish him of his constitutional rights to remain silent and against self-incrimination, i.e. the right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself.

Under the above-cited section 20 of the Bill of Rights, any confession or incriminatory statement obtained in violation thereof is expressly declared "inadmissible in evidence."

Book Review, Bernas' Constitutional Reviewer

Only four days to go before the start of the Bar exams. For this coming Sunday, it's going to be Political Law and Labor Law. For practically all bar takers, they surely want to have a good start for the first exam of the bar - which is Political Law. And in order to have that good start, every bar taker must have in their arsenal Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas' The 1987 Philippine Constitution A Comprehensive Reviewer.

Originally known as the Primer, Fr. B's 2006 edition Reviewer is arguably the best Consti reviewer there is. In this Q&A book, the most relevant case laws are already digested, cutting to the core of the issues for the reader's convenience. Thus, it is easy to read, since it is concise in form without sacrificing the substance. Moreover, the codal provisions of the Constitution are already incorporated, so you don't have to cross-refer the discussions with your bulky codal.

On the minus side, this edition has quite a number of typographical errors. But there is no major typo, though. At most, the typos will distract your reading from time to time.

All in all, a highly recommended book. It's a no brainer - if you're a bar taker and you haven't read this book yet, maybe you still can. After all, there are still four days left before the bar exams.


Title: The 1987 Philippine Constitution A Comprehensive Reviewer
Author: Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.
Year of Publication: 2006
Publisher: Rex Bookstore, Inc.
Number of Pages: 580


Image courtesy of rexpublishing.com.